Baltic GPS Jamming Incidents in 2024
GPS jamming in the Baltic states has intensified dramatically since 2022, with interference originating primarily from the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. Monthly incident data shows clear correlation with military exercises and geopolitical tensions.
Annual Totals
Monthly Incident Data (2024)
| Month | Incidents | Intensity | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jan | 2,800 | Moderate | Baseline winter level |
| Feb | 3,100 | Moderate | Anniversary of Ukraine conflict |
| Mar | 3,600 | Moderate | Spring exercise season begins |
| Apr | 4,200 | High | NATO exercise response |
| May | 5,100 | High | Peak spring jamming |
| Jun | 4,400 | High | Summer transit season |
| Jul | 3,200 | Moderate | Brief reduction |
| Aug | 3,800 | Moderate | Resumed activity |
| Sep | 5,600 | Very High | Autumn exercise peak |
| Oct | 8,400 | Extreme | Highest recorded month |
| Nov | 3,600 | Moderate | Finnair Tartu suspension |
| Dec | 2,200 | Low | Winter reduction |
Kaliningrad Correlation
Analysis of jamming patterns shows strong correlation (r=0.87) between Kaliningrad military exercise schedules and GPS interference intensity in the Baltic region. The interference radius extends approximately 300 km from the Kaliningrad exclave, primarily affecting:
Sources
- Estonian Transport Administration — GNSS interference reports, 2022-2025
- Eurocontrol — Baltic GNSS interference monitoring data
- NATO — Electromagnetic spectrum monitoring reports (public summaries)
- Finnair — Public statements on GPS jamming impact, 2024
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