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FLYSAFE DATA · UPDATED APRIL 2026
3 zones

GPS Spoofing Hotspots by Region

GPS spoofing is concentrated in three primary regions: the Middle East (particularly around Iraq, Iran, and the eastern Mediterranean), the Baltic states (Kaliningrad-origin interference), and the broader Mediterranean (Libya, eastern Med). Each region exhibits distinct patterns and sources.

Regional Share of Global GPS Spoofing (2025)

40%
Middle East
28%
Baltic / Scandinavia
18%
Mediterranean / North Africa
14%
Rest of world

The Middle East has been the dominant spoofing region since 2022, driven by GPS interference originating from multiple state actors. The Baltic region surged in 2023-2024, with Kaliningrad-origin jamming and spoofing affecting flights across Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Finland. Mediterranean spoofing increased in 2024-2025, with hotspots near Libya and the eastern Mediterranean.

Yearly Trend by Region

YearMiddle EastBalticMediterraneanOther
20223,8001,200600400
20238,5006,2002,1001,200
202418,00014,5008,2004,300
202522,00015,4009,8007,800

Regional Characteristics

Middle East

Primary hotspots: Baghdad FIR, Tehran FIR western border, eastern Mediterranean near Cyprus/Lebanon. Spoofing often relocates aircraft positions to airport coordinates (typically Ben Gurion or Beirut), triggering false GPWS warnings. Multiple state actors involved.

Baltic / Scandinavia

Kaliningrad exclave is the primary source. Affects Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, and parts of Poland and Sweden. Primarily jamming rather than spoofing, causing GPS signal loss rather than position displacement. Intensity correlates with military activity.

Mediterranean

Growing hotspot centered on the eastern Mediterranean (Cyprus, Crete corridor) and near Libyan airspace. Mix of jamming and spoofing, with position displacement of up to 150 nautical miles reported by overflying aircraft.

Sources

  • OPSGROUP — GPS Spoofing and Jamming pilot reports database, 2022-2025
  • Eurocontrol — GNSS interference monitoring, European airspace
  • IATA — GNSS interference threat assessment, 2025
  • University of Texas Radionavigation Laboratory — GPS spoofing detection data

Cite this data:

This page provides publicly available information about airspace conditions. Always consult official sources (ICAO, EASA, FAA) for operational decisions.