GPS Spoofing Incidents by Country (2024–2025)
Country-level breakdown of reported GPS spoofing events affecting commercial aviation, aggregated from public sources. The figures represent reports submitted to national authorities and operator advisories during 2024 and 2025; methodologies differ between sources, so totals are presented as ranges where appropriate. Reuse permitted under CC-BY 4.0 with attribution.
Reported GPS Spoofing — Country Summary
| Country | Primary FIR(s) | Reporting density 2024–25 (editorial) | Primary source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Israel | LLLL | Very high | OPSGROUP, IATA, academic |
| Iran | OIIX | Very high | OPSGROUP, EASA SIB |
| Iraq | ORBB | Very high | OPSGROUP, EASA SIB |
| Cyprus | LCCC | High | EASA SIB, EUROCONTROL |
| Türkiye | LTBB / LTAA | High | EUROCONTROL |
| Egypt | HECC | Elevated | OPSGROUP |
| Estonia | EETT | Elevated | EUROCONTROL, Traficom EE |
| Latvia | EVRR | Elevated | EUROCONTROL, LV CAA |
| Lithuania | EYVL | Elevated | EUROCONTROL, LT CAA |
| Finland | EFIN | Elevated | Traficom FI, academic |
| Poland (north) | EPWW | Elevated | EUROCONTROL, PL CAA |
| Romania (Black Sea) | LRBB | Moderate | EUROCONTROL |
| Bulgaria (Black Sea) | LBSR | Moderate | EUROCONTROL |
| Russian-controlled FIRs | UUWV / URRV / USSV / UWWW (selected) | Elevated (operator-restricted) | OPSGROUP, EUROCONTROL (where data available) |
| Other (low density) | Various | Low / sporadic | Local CAAs, academic |
Editorial note: the "Reporting density" column shows FlySafe's qualitative editorial categorisation of publicly reported 2024–2025 events, not an authoritative ranking. The categorisation is derived by summarising the listed primary sources; cadence definitions are explained in the Methodology section below. For authoritative event counts, consult the primary source listed in each row.
Methodology
The country-level reporting density is derived by aggregating publicly available 2024–2025 reports from the listed sources, normalising for flight-time exposure where the source provides the underlying data, and assigning qualitative bands. The bands are: very high (sustained reports across the full period with multiple distinct events per week at peak), high (sustained reports with weekly cadence), elevated (recurring reports with monthly cadence), moderate (intermittent reports), low (sporadic reports below monthly cadence).
Country attribution refers to the location of the reporting flight or aircraft, not to any actor responsible for the interference. Public aviation reporting frameworks describe interference geographically without identifying source actors. For source-actor attribution, consult academic publications such as those from the Stanford GNSS Lab and University of Texas Radionavigation Lab.
Primary Sources
- EUROCONTROL Network Manager — operational publications and incident summaries
- OPSGROUP — operator-community reporting on GNSS interference
- GPSJAM (gpsjam.org) — ADS-B-derived NIC quality maps
- EASA Safety Information Bulletins (SIBs) on GNSS
- IATA — aggregated industry reporting and operator surveys
- National civil aviation authorities of the listed countries
- Academic groups: Stanford GNSS Lab, University of Texas Radionavigation Lab, and peer-reviewed publications in aviation and navigation journals
Related Datasets and Briefings
GPS Spoofing by Country — Frequently Asked Questions
Common search queries answered with current status, FIR codes, and source citations.
- Which countries report the most GPS spoofing affecting aviation?
- Public data through 2024–2025 indicates the highest reported densities of aircraft GPS spoofing events near or over Israel, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Cyprus, Türkiye, Russian-controlled FIRs, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Poland, and Romania. The exact ranking varies by reporting methodology — flight-time exposure vs incident count vs aircraft affected. Authoritative aggregates are published by EUROCONTROL Network Manager and academic groups (Stanford GNSS Lab, University of Texas Radionavigation Lab).
- How is GPS spoofing measured?
- Three principal measurement approaches are used: (1) ADS-B-derived NIC quality (positional integrity) maps such as GPSJAM; (2) airline incident reports filed with national authorities under EASA SIB or FAA SafetyMatters channels; (3) on-board avionics anomaly logs disclosed in academic studies. Each method has different coverage and false-positive characteristics. Aggregated counts therefore vary significantly between sources.
- What is the difference between jamming and spoofing in this context?
- GPS jamming is the deliberate transmission of noise on GNSS frequencies that prevents receivers from acquiring position. GPS spoofing is the transmission of counterfeit GNSS signals that cause receivers to compute a false position. Spoofing is more sophisticated and harder to detect on board. Public aviation interference statistics typically report jamming and spoofing separately or as a combined "GNSS interference" total.
- Are these spoofing events directly affecting flights?
- Aircraft are designed to operate with multi-sensor navigation that includes inertial reference systems and ground-based aids. When GNSS quality degrades, on-board systems fall back automatically. Operational impacts include increased crew workload, occasional diversions to airports with full instrument landing systems, and avoidance of selected approach procedures that depend on GNSS. Public reports do not indicate hull-loss events directly attributable to GNSS spoofing.
- How can I cite this dataset?
- This page is published under CC-BY 4.0. Suggested citation: "FlySafe (2026). GPS Spoofing Incidents by Country, 2024–2025. flysafe.zone/data/gps-spoofing-incidents-by-country/". When citing specific numbers, please also reference the underlying primary source listed in the table footnotes.
FlySafe provides automated computation of numerical indices from publicly available data. Reporting density categories are qualitative descriptors derived from public aggregations and are not authoritative incident counts. Operators must consult their own intelligence and aviation authority guidance for operational decisions. Dataset reuse permitted under CC-BY 4.0 with attribution. See Terms of Service.