Baltic & Nordic Airspace: GPS Jamming from Kaliningrad

GPS jamming in the Baltic region differs fundamentally from the spoofing campaigns documented in the Middle East. Jamming denies the GNSS signal entirely rather than feeding false positions. According to Eurocontrol reporting, aircraft operating in affected areas lose GPS-derived navigation and must revert to conventional aids, primarily ILS for approaches and VOR/DME for en-route segments. While less insidious than spoofing (pilots receive clear GNSS-loss indications rather than false data), the operational impact is significant for airports and routes that have been designed around RNAV/GNSS procedures.

Finnair publicly suspended its Tallinn-to-Tartu route in 2024 after repeated GPS loss events during approach, citing safety concerns with GNSS-dependent procedures at Tartu airport. The Estonian Civil Aviation Authority confirmed persistent interference affecting their FIR. Similar patterns have been documented over Latvia, Lithuania, and the eastern portion of the Finnish FIR. Poland's northern airspace sectors have also been affected, with multiple airports temporarily closed in 2025 due to unidentified drone incursions that coincided with periods of GPS degradation.

The drone dimension adds operational complexity. Throughout 2024 and 2025, Nordic and Baltic countries reported waves of drone sightings near critical infrastructure, including airports. Copenhagen experienced a significant drone incursion in 2025, and multiple Polish airports were temporarily shut down. These events, documented in national aviation authority publications, have prompted discussions about counter-UAS capabilities at European airports and raised questions about the intersection of electronic warfare and civil aviation safety.

For operators, the practical impact centers on approach procedures. Airports in the affected zone have published or activated ILS-only approach procedures during jamming events. Crew training for conventional navigation approaches has become a documented priority for carriers operating in the region. Eurocontrol has issued guidance on GPS jamming mitigation, and EASA has published safety information bulletins addressing GNSS interference in the Baltic states.