By: FlySafe Research
Between 1 January and 5 July 2026, FlySafe airspace-risk collectors logged 217 confirmed airspace-disruption events across 54 flight information regions (FIRs), amounting to 941 airspace-days lost. A confirmed event, in this dataset, is one corroborated by at least two independent signals with an attributed cause; undetermined-cause detections are excluded. This bulletin reports the disruption metrics only — which FIRs lost the most flying days, how the events distributed across the year, and how they were detected. It does not attribute causes.
FlySafe analysis shows the burden is heavily concentrated: the six most-affected FIRs account for a large share of the 941-day total, and detection depended far more on flight-traffic observation than on published notices.
Most Disrupted FIRs by Airspace-Days (as of 2026-07-05)
The ranking below is ordered by airspace-days — the metric that best captures sustained operational impact, as distinct from a raw event count. Corroboration columns show the share of each FIR's confirmed events verified by live flight-traffic observation and by NOTAM, respectively.
| Rank | FIR | ICAO | Events | Airspace-days | Flight-traffic corrob. | NOTAM corrob. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Tehran FIR | OIIX | 35 | 240.0 | 94% | 37% |
| 2 | Damascus FIR | OSTT | 26 | 136.0 | 73% | 23% |
| 3 | RPHI | RPHI | 9 | 98.0 | 0% | 67% |
| 4 | Tel Aviv FIR | LLLL | 22 | 92.0 | 95% | 23% |
| 5 | MMFR | MMFR | 6 | 76.0 | 100% | 83% |
| 6 | UUWV | UUWV | 9 | 31.0 | 89% | 22% |
Source: FlySafe airspace-risk collectors, confirmed events only, window 2026-01-01 to 2026-07-05.
Tehran FIR (OIIX) leads by a wide margin at 240.0 airspace-days across 35 events — roughly a quarter of the year-to-date total on its own. Damascus FIR (OSTT) follows at 136.0 days. Two entries stand out for how they were detected rather than their volume. RPHI recorded 98.0 airspace-days with zero flight-traffic corroboration and 67% NOTAM corroboration — the only FIR in the top six where published notices, not observed traffic, carried the detection. MMFR shows the inverse profile at the high end: 100% flight-traffic corroboration and 83% NOTAM corroboration across just six events.
FlySafe does not currently publish per-FIR cost figures, specific carrier reroute counts, or individual NOTAM identifiers for these events. Where those details are not held, they are stated as unavailable rather than estimated.
Monthly Trend: Confirmed Events by Month
The year did not distribute events evenly. Confirmed-event counts climbed sharply through the second quarter:
| Month | Confirmed events |
|---|---|
| January | 5 |
| February | 16 |
| March | 1 |
| April | 21 |
| May | 72 |
| June | 93 |
| July (to 5th) | 9 |
Source: FlySafe airspace-risk collectors, as of 2026-07-05.
May and June together account for 165 of the 217 confirmed events. March registered a single confirmed event, the lowest month in the window. The July figure covers only the first five days and is not directly comparable to full months. Because these are event counts rather than airspace-days, they describe frequency of onset, not the duration of any individual disruption.
The Detection Signal-Gap
Across FIRs with three or more confirmed events, flight-traffic observation corroborated roughly 75% of events, while NOTAM corroborated roughly 22%. In practice, a review built on published notices alone would miss the majority of confirmed disruptions.
This gap is visible directly in the ranking table. Tel Aviv FIR (LLLL) shows 95% flight-traffic corroboration against 23% NOTAM corroboration; Tehran FIR (OIIX) shows 94% against 37%. The RPHI row is the documented exception, where NOTAM corroboration (67%) exceeded flight-traffic corroboration (0%) — a reminder that neither signal alone is sufficient. FlySafe has examined this pattern in more detail in its analysis of how notices miss roughly 78% of disruptions, and readers tracking current restrictions may find the companion piece on tracking live airspace closures and routes useful.
Regulatory Context
The frameworks below govern how airspace status is declared, notified, and operated around. They are cited here for reference; this bulletin does not assert that any specific FIR above is in a particular regulatory state.
- ICAO Annex 11 (Air Traffic Services) and ICAO Annex 15 (Aeronautical Information Services) define how states establish FIRs and disseminate changes to airspace status, including through NOTAM. The corroboration figures above quantify how often those notices accompanied an observed disruption.
- ICAO Annex 17 (Security) and ICAO Annex 19 (Safety Management) frame the state-level obligations for risk information over affected regions.
- EASA Conflict Zone Information Bulletins (CZIB) are advisory instruments. Under the terminology used here, a CZIB issued without a supporting state-level NOTAM or AIP entry is "advisory only" and does not by itself close or restrict airspace.
- EU Regulation 965/2012 (Air Operations) and 14 CFR Part 91 (including §91.703 for operations outside US airspace) set the operator-side rules for planning around restricted or advisory volumes.
Operators should treat the distinction between "closed" (full NOTAM/AIP prohibition), "restricted" (conditional operations) and "advisory only" (guidance without state-level force) as decisive. This dataset measures disruption; it does not itself carry regulatory force. For a route-level view, FlySafe's overview of Middle East airspace closures reshaping global routes covers the planning implications.
Key Takeaway
Airspace disruption in the first half of 2026 was concentrated in a small number of FIRs — Tehran (OIIX) and Damascus (OSTT) alone account for 376 of 941 airspace-days — and rose steeply through May and June. Just as important, most confirmed events were caught by observed flight-traffic rather than by published notices. A monitoring posture that relies on NOTAM review alone would have missed the majority of them.
Methodology & Provenance
- Window: 1 January 2026 to 5 July 2026. Data as of: 2026-07-05.
- Confirmed events only: each event required at least two independent signals and an attributed cause. Undetermined-cause detections were excluded.
- Consensus engine: FlySafe requires two or more independent signals per event. FlySafe's own ADS-B flight-traffic collection is the primary corroborating signal. Inputs include public NOTAM, EASA and FAA-TFR advisories, volcanic-ash and seismic advisories, and FlySafe ADS-B.
- Metric definitions: "airspace-days" measures cumulative duration of confirmed disruption per FIR; "events" measures frequency of onset. The two are not interchangeable.
- Not held / not published: per-FIR cost figures, carrier-level reroute data, and individual NOTAM identifiers are not part of this dataset and are not estimated here.
Disclaimer
Analysis based on publicly available data only. FlySafe Research is an aviation risk intelligence service and is not an operational authority. Nothing in this bulletin constitutes an airspace closure, restriction, clearance, or authorization. Pilots, dispatchers, and airlines must consult the responsible state civil aviation authority, current NOTAMs, and applicable AIP entries before operating in or around any FIR referenced above. For continuously updated airspace-risk monitoring, see FlySafe.
- Авиационные инциденты резко ускорились во втором квартале: май и июнь дали 165 из 217 подтверждённых событий (76% годового объёма за два месяца), тогда как март зафиксировал всего одно событие.
- Тегеранский FIR (OIIX) в одиночку поглотил 240 из 941 воздушных суток — около четверти всей годовой потери по всем 54 районам полётной информации.
- NOTAMы оказались вторичным сигналом обнаружения: у пяти из шести наиболее пострадавших FIR доля подтверждения через наблюдение за трафиком превышала долю через официальные извещения — в случае Тель-Авива разрыв составил 95% против 23%.
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Information is accurate as of the publication date. FlySafe uses exclusively publicly available data.